

THE PARADOX OF INSTITUTION BUILDING AFTER CIVIL WAR:  
A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN SHORT-TERM PEACEMAKING AND  
LONG-TERM DEMOCRACY BUILDING

ABSTRACT

What causes the success or failure of democratization in post-civil war societies? In particular, how does post-conflict institutional design influence both short-term peacemaking and long-term prospects for democratic governance? This dissertation argues that in countries emerging from deadly internal conflict, political institutions well designed to end civil war are not necessarily as effective for promoting democratic governance. There is a trade-off between the short-term interest in ending civil war as quickly as possible through power-sharing arrangements and the long-term goal of democracy promotion: power sharing does contribute to negotiated settlement to civil war through institutionally guaranteeing the security of warring parties, but it is less conducive to establishing democracy in the long run due to its tendency to lock war-induced cleavages into post-war political structures. The dissertation tests this central hypothesis using a multi-method approach that combines a series of event history analysis of 75 post-civil war countries in 1946-2002 with a paired comparison of two post-civil war societies – Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mozambique.