Carnapian Theses in Metaontology and Metaethics.
Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions.
Vagueness and Second-Level Indeterminacy. (For OUP anthology on vagueness, edited
by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi.)
Carnap and Ontological Pluralism. (For David Chalmers, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman
(eds.), Metametaphysics,
OUP.)
Putnam on Ontology.
Forthcoming in proceedings from conference on Hilary Putnam's
pragmatism, Rodopi.
Deconstructing Ontological Vagueness. Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
The Ontological Significance of Inscrutability. Forthcoming in Philosophical Topics.
Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy. Forthcoming in special volume of Synthèse, devoted to the Bad
Company objection to neo-Fregeanism in the philosophy of mathematics, edited by
Oystein Linnebo.
The Liar Paradox, Expressibility,
Possible Languages. In JC Beall (ed.), The Revenge of the Liar, OUP.
The Picture of Reality as an Amorphous Lump. In Ted Sider, John Hawthorne and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics,
Blackwell.
Sider on Existence.
Noûs 41: 519-28. (Link to Noûs.) [Co-authored with David Liebesman]
Characterizing Vagueness. Philosophy Compass 2: 896-909. (Link to Philosophy Compass.)
Neo-Fregean Ontology. In John Hawthorne (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 20, Metaphysics,
2006. (Link to Blackwell Synergy.)
Metaontology. Philosophy Compass 1: 317-34. (Link to Philosophy Compass.)
Schiffer on Vagueness. Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 87: 12-23.
The Liar Paradox and
Metaphysics. In J. Skilters,
M. Eklund, O. Jonsson and O. Wiegand
(eds.), Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and
Communicative Aspects,
Fiction, Indifference and Ontology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71: 557-79.
What Vagueness Consists In. Philosophical Studies 125: 27-60.
Personal Identity, Concerns and Indeterminacy. The Monist 87:
489-511. Special issue on personal identity, edited by Tamar Gendler and Dean Zimmerman.
Personal Identity and Conceptual Incoherence. Noûs 36: 465-85.
Inconsistent Languages. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 64: 251-75.
Deep Inconsistency. Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 80: 321-31.
A Vindication of Tarski's Claims
about the Liar Paradox. In Timothy Childers and Ondrej
Majer eds.), The
Logica Yearbook 2001,
Is Hintikka's Logic First-Order? Synthèse 131: 371-88.
[Co-authored with Daniel Kolak.]
Peter van Inwagen on Material
Beings. Ratio 15: 245-56.
Paradoxer: en allmän diagnos.
Filosofisk Tidskrift 23: 42-52. (In
Swedish.)
Supervaluationism, Vagueifiers, and Semantic Overdetermination. Dialectica
55:
363-78.
The Aims of Logical Empiricism as a Philosophy of Science. Acta Analytica 15: 137-59.
On How Logic Became First-Order. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 1: 147-67.