Rural Electrification in Kerala- A Power Play
'Khoj' magazine, vol 4, p.41-44. Only text reproduced here.

In recent years, practitioners have been exploring alternative technologies to find solutions to rural community needs that conventional approaches cannot address. One such technology is micro-hydropower (or microhydel, or mh), small scale hydropower ranging from a few hundred watts to 300 KW. This concept is not new. China is the world leader in micro-hydropower with 1/3 of its energy coming from mh alone. Sri Lanka and Nepal have also developed this option in the last few decades. In India, the government has looked into this option, but approaches have been lop-sided. This is a case study which shows how alternatives like mh need as much 'homework' as any other conventional strategy, and how the success of rural development ventures is dependent on local contextual factors.

The failure of the Sugandagiri and Pookhot projects demonstrates how 'outsiders' have gone about executing a project for an isolated community (tribals) without their participation and then literally abandoned it in a bureaucratic mess-up. To the tribals it remained something obscure, with no active support from the plantation officials. The successful community project in Pathanpura provides a welcome contrast, executed in just 2 months in late 1997, and supplying electricity to 54 houses, 17 shops and street lights.

The Pookhot Milk Dairy and the Sugandagiri Cardamom Project are situated about 20 kilometres from Kalpetta, Vyanad District, Kerala. They cover massive areas of hilly land. Sugandagiri covers about 5000 hectares of which 1500 acres are under cultivation, and Pookhot covers about 300 hectares. These projects were started in the late 1970s by the Government of Kerala as 'tribal rehabilitation' programs, and were to be handed over gradually to the tribals themselves. There is no sign of that happening. These projects employ the tribals on daily wages. Though initially, about 750 families were brought into the Sugandagiri project and 110 families into the Pookhot project, several tribals have been leaving the area. At present, about 500 families live in Sugandagiri and about 55 in Pookhot. Both estates are government of Kerala undertakings, run by a Managing Director (MD) and the Chairman ( District Collector, Wynad).

Great expectations
In 1991-92, three agencies entered into an agreement with the plantation authorities to set up a 10 Kilowatt micro-hydropower project, each at Sungandagiri and Pookhot. The agencies were: the Department of Science and Technology, (DST) Government of India; the Agency for Non-conventional Energy for Rural Technology (ANERT); and Steel Industries Limited, Kerala (SILK). Funding for the project was arranged by DST and ANERT, SILK executed the project, and IISc (Indian Institute of Science), Bangalore provided the turbine design. Hailed at the time as a pioneering effort, the two projects (costing close to 10 lakhs each in 1993) ground to a halt in less than two years.

We visited these areas in January, 1998 under the impression that they have been working all these years and are perfect examples of the relevance of micro-hydel for rural electrification. We were mistaken.
Both are text-book micro-hydel installations displaying a high level of technical competence. This makes it all the more disturbing that they failed.

At Pookhot, the civil works (i.e.- check dam, surge tank, supporting structures) were intact. But the three wooden gates of the check dam are missing or stolen. No settling tank has been used. The intake was silted considerably and the inlet of the penstock seems to be too close to the bottom. According to officials, desilting should not be a problem. The powerhouse (i.e.- the generator, control panel and its wiring and the ballast) seem to be intact. There is no record of the turbine being damaged either. Some indicator lamps on the control panel are missing. Street lights have been removed or are missing. Transmission lines from the power house to the settlement seem intact. Wiring of the street lights are not intact. According to the electrical inspector's report, there are some errors in the electrical connections at the generator's end which can be rectified.

At Sugandagiri, the civil works are intact. The wooden gate has been removed. There are no settling or surge tanks. The valve for desilting is missing and the silt is standing at least 1.5 metres above it. According to officials, it could be removed. The water from the dam is now being used for irrigation. According to the electrical inspector's report, the turbine is damaged but could be repaired. The control panel and the ballast loads are significantly damaged. Half of the ballast coils are smashed and the wires of the control panel ripped out. Bulbs and tube lights are missing or damaged.

Why did the projects fail?
Different people responded differently to queries as to why the projects failed.. While the general attitude of the plantation officials is anti-tribal ( and these were the people who were supposed to manage the project after the initial 6 months), others laid the blame on ANERT for mismanagement. Still others attribute it to the refusal of the plantation to pay the wages to the operator. With the present MD's permission (Mr. Srinivas, IAS), we were able to peruse the records of the correspondence between the three agencies which give a clear picture of the bureaucratic muddle that resulted in the failure of the project.

At Pookhot, the plant was to electrify 37 houses with one 40 watt tube light, one 40 watt bulb, and a 20 watt plug point. In addition to this, power was proposed to a milk chilling plant and a water pump. However, the plant finally supplied energy to only 12 houses. These were located on the crest of a hill near the power station and are now occupied by employees (also tribals) of the Priyadarshini Tea Plantation, which is also a Government of Kerala undertaking. The total official project cost stood at 9.90 lakhs, but by adopting the IISc turbine design, it was brought down to 8.33 lakhs in 1991-92.

The paper chase
A confusing series of documents and correspondence between the various players reveal a gradual breakdown in communication. For example, here is an excerpt from the minutes of the meeting of ten officials of the three agencies with the District Collector of Wynad District: "It was decided to train for six months two tribal youth in the routine operation and running of the plant. The training will be imparted by SILK. ANERT will pay a monthly stipend of Rs. 500 for each of these trainees during the period of training and on completion of the training they will be paid by the user agency…" The minutes of the meeting mention the training of two tribals and their pay, but the same does not find a mention in the written agreement between Sugandagiri Cardamom Project, ANERT and DST, which states, "The system shall be maintained and run by representatives of SILK for the first 6 months after commissioning. User shall make arrangements to get suitable persons to get trained at their cost in the activities including running and maintaining of the systems…"

Significantly, many people we talked to said that the Plantation refused to bear the wages of the operator, saying that such an expense was not incorporated in their budget. The gate-keeper says he was running the plant for three months but could not/would not say how much longer it functioned.

The Pookhot MH plant was inaugurated on October 29, 1991, but after that there seemed to be uncertainty as to exactly what each agency was responsible for. On June 10, 1992 SILK sent ANERT a letter requesting them to take over the operation of the plant, as the training period was complete and their job was done. The Managing Director sent the local ANERT office a letter on July 17, 1992, stating that SILK was no longer involved in the project, and revealing that the station had not been functioning since 26th June, because SILK officials had closed down operations and left without handing over the key to the powerhouse. From the last few letters, a picture of communication breakdowns between SILK, ANERT and the Plantation emerges. While SILK was mainly concerned with the technical execution of the project, local management and interaction was the concern of Plantation authorities and ANERT, in which they seem to have failed.

In August, the MD received a letter from the Pookhot office, stating that since only 3 out of 12 houses are occupied, it is not worthwhile to keep an operator at the site. It was suggested that the three families either be transferred out of the site, or allowed to look after the system themselves. We observed that the 12 houses on the hill are pretty far from the other tribal settlements and access to water was also a problem. Officials say that gradually, the tribals staying here returned to their families who were staying in another part of the estate. Actually, the tribals have gradually been leaving the plantations, especially since the death of a large number of dairy cows. This letter also suggests that the tribals were not operating the system by themselves. The MD sent a hand written reply to the Pookhot office saying that as long as some people were staying there, the operation of the system must continue as it is. This seems to be the last written record indicating that after SILK left, the hydel plant was operated in fits and starts. By now it is clear that no one on particular, neither the officials nor the tribals themselves, were too keen on running the plant.

The Plantation officials sent ANERT a letter on February 23, 1993, requesting them to rectify several problems, including: removing silt from the dam, clamping the cable properly, and correcting neutral and earth connections. But nothing was done, for whatever reason- lack of initiative, intent, money, or all three- by any party. Finally ,on March 16, 1993, the Plantation office sent a letter to the electrical inspector stating that the plant is not functioning because there were no people staying there, and the dam was silted. No other significant correspondence was recorded in the file from 1993 to 1997. Why? It is clear that this letter marks the end of any "effort" to get it going again. People also mentioned the hostility between the tribals and officials a few years ago when the tribals demanded a raise in daily wages. During this period there cannot be a question of any serious effort on anyone's part for reviving the project. But on March 6, 1997, ANERT did receive a letter from it's local office regarding a meeting with the District Planning Commissioner referring to a site visit and a plan to revive the project, with the help of a scientist.

Throughout all this correspondence, there is no mention of the tribals whatsoever. If there is talk of reviving the project, why haven't they been involved? When there is no indication of their participation, even during implementation of the project, is there any chance of them being consulted now? Who is this project for, anyway?

In fact, the tribals were blamed for sabotaging the Sugandagiri MH plant. When, on July 7, 1993- less than two months after the plantation took over the operations of the MH plant- the station was reported not to be working, the plantation officials squarely blamed the tribals, who reportedly put pieces of metal into the penstock. The damage to the control panel and ballast is also attributed to them. Why was there so much resentment against the project? Perhaps part of the answer can be found in the social upheavals and trauma that tribals face.

The realities of tribal life
In an answer to the question, "Should the projects be revived?", the initial inspection that we made suggests that the project could probably be revived in the technical sense. But the relevance of such an effort, given the prevailing atmosphere, is questionable. With limited knowledge regarding tribal issues and their fast- eroding culture, except what we read sometimes in the papers ( we were not able to meet and talk to many tribals; would that have helped?), we tried to get the opinions of the local people as to what is going on. Here, we came across two opposite viewpoints with the line clearly drawn in favour of, or against, the tribals.

We were directed to the local office of "Maadr bhoomi", a newspaper, with the impression that we might get some details of the project and the conflict between the officials and the tribals. However, the two reporters we talked to had totally anti-tribal viewpoints. The following are some of their opinions:

  '  The main reason for the failure of the projects is that the authorities did not figure on the kind of people who would use it, a group of people indifferent to both the benefits and the pains involved in implementing it…

The tribals are a very selfish people with a narrow point of view. They can only think of their own happiness and do not care if they achieve it at somebody else's cost.

The Government projects are suffering a huge loss because the tribals steal the cardamom/milk and sell it outside. The authorities are not able to take any action because of 'big shots'- politicians, social workers- who blindly support the tribals. Anyone taking any action against the tribals is in danger of losing his job.'

Other local magazines voice opposite opinions. For instance, an article in the January 2, 1998 issue of "Samakalika Malayalam" chronicled the gruesome immolation of a seven- month pregnant tribal woman by a non- tribal, upper-caste man, with whom she had been having an affair. The article claims that such atrocities against tribal women are common in Wynad district, and further that the police is not taking an interest in these problems. Of the 53 rape complaints this year, it claims, only 23 cases have been registered and only one was convicted. In 13 cases, the accused were let free, and in 9, investigations led nowhere.

The article also claims that starvation deaths are becoming very common on the Sugandagiri and Priyadarshini government- run plantations. The starvation in estates can be attributed to unemployment. Not only are tribals not receiving their due wages, the amount of available work has reduced. Unemployment leads to sexual exploitation and other indignities. As one tribal leader asks, " When a society is facing starvation, how can you expect them to be 'good-mannered' ?"

Thankfully, there are positive stories, as well.

Successful Micro-hydel ventures in Kerala
In contrast to the failed projects in Wynad, ideal examples of how micro-hydel can succeed both at individual and community levels are to be found in Kannur district, Kerala. There are reportedly 300 Pico- hydel units in Kannur district alone. Most of these are used for lighting on an individual basis, and several are small units manufactured and sold by one person named Jose. However, the best example of a people's movement in community electrification by micro-hydel is the Pathanpara project, which at present lights up 54 houses, 17 shops and street lights. The brainchild of Anil Kumar, Samuel Thomas (two engineers from Kannur who have worked on micro-hydel for some time), their colleagues and Professor Nambiar, the community has generated electricity for itself without help from any technical or government institution.

The Pathanpura Project: light at last
Pathanpura is situated in one of the highest mountain ranges of Kannur. The community consists of around 450 families; settlers who first arrived in the area some 50 years ago. The community is predominantly Christian. This is not the first time that the people have got together on a project: a year ago they formed a registered trust, the Kanakeeya Vikasana Samithi (People's Society for Village Development). The parish priest, Father Mathew Asariparambil, mobilised them to buy a bus of their own. Thus was formed 'Pathanpura Travels', which now offers public transport to the community, previously dependent on jeep taxis.

For the Pathanpura MH project, Anil and Samuel approached Father Mathew after surveying the potential in the area. Having applied to the Kerala State Electricity Board for 17 years for grid extension (and rejected on the grounds that the transmission losses alone would be 10%), the priest proposed the project to the people. Initially, 32 houses agreed and contributed Rs.6000 each. Work began in October 1997 with 600 members of the community constructing all the civil works. A path was cut through the hilly terrain and a 300 metre pipeline was laid. An artificial pond was dug in two weeks and water diverted from two streams into this pond. Anil, Samuel and their team set up the turbine and generator.

This constitutes the first phase of the project, which was completed in just two months and inaugurated on December 24, 1997 at 6:30 p.m. There were no politicians or even mikes, only Trivandrum Doordarshan and newspersons were invited. Before the inauguration, letters were written to the Chief Minister of Kerala and the President. At present, 40 houses are each provided with 100 watts. This is enough for five 20 watt compact fluorescent lamps. The first phase cost Rs. 2.6 lakh. Those who could not afford Rs. 6000 were given two lights for Rs.2000.

A second phase is proposed, which will generate 10 Kilowatts so that the entire community can be provided with electricity. This will also mean that the power at each house's disposal would be 300 watts. The community plans to harness hydropower for running small industries in the future: a flour mill, rubber processing, workshop for furniture making and food processing are some of the options they are discussing. The second phase is expected to be completed in a year and they plan to call well-known activist Medha Patkar to inaugurate it .

The project has received considerable coverage from the media, including 'Maadr Bhoomi' and 'Malayalam Manorama'. They have hailed it as India's biggest micro-hydel project to be executed by the people themselves. Christmas in Pathanpura was celebrated with light when, on December 17th, the street lights and decorations were lit up for the first time.

Final thoughts

The problem of rural community electrification by alternatives like micro hydropower is not just technically complex. In fact, despite technical excellence, such efforts have often failed because of a 'top-down approach', where the beneficiaries have not been involved in the process of solving their own needs. This is what happened in the case of two failed projects in Kerala which were put up, supposedly for tribals.

On the other hand, local entrepreneurs have demonstrated that they are no less technically competent in putting up a community project without any institutional support. Since the people in need have themselves found and implemented a solution, the project is an unqualified success.

Since then, based on some pilot projects in July and August, a movement of sorts is on in Kerala. The Planning Board and district and village panchayats in several districts are actively supporting such endeavours, and projects are on-going at tremendous speed.

We hope that the experiences of failed efforts will serve as a reminder to practitioners that the inherent sustainability of any venture will always be dependent on specific contextual factors, especially in the complex Indian social and cultural framework.